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To say that immigration is a hot topic in Britain and beyond would be something of an understatement. In the contemporary era, it has filled newspaper columns, fuelled televised ‘debates’, dominated election cycles, informed policy proposals and underpinned the rise and fall of various political parties. In the past decade, alongside the economy, it has been the issue that the British public has identified as ‘the major challenge facing the country’. Recent data from the British Social Attitudes Survey indicates that three in four people want immigration reduced, with half wanting it cut by ‘a lot’. 

Unsurprisingly, these processes have been tracked by academics and policy makers with two key strands emerging. First, academic research has charted how boundaries of belonging within Britain have shifted over time in relation to processes of de/colonisation, regionalisation and expanding global mobility, whilst also looking to address the plight of marginalized groups. The second strand has tended to focus on the extent to which different groups contribute to wider society and, in particular, who has the right to access economic resources, including jobs, healthcare, welfare benefits and housing. On the one hand, are those who emphasise the contribution migrants have made, in terms of the taxes they pay, the jobs they create and the horrible, yet necessary, work they often undertake. On the other, are those who argue that migrants take jobs, housing and other benefits away from host populations. 

Part of the problem with these two perspectives, as important as they may be, is that they only provide part of the answer to two key questions; why does the movement of people across borders generate such controversy and who does this issue matter to most? In putting forward my own answers to these questions, I argue that we need to take into account the ongoing importance of the nation in the contemporary era and the extent to which national forms of identification and organisation continue to pattern and give meaning to the lives of substantial numbers of people. 

In the first place, cross-border migration only becomes an issue if one takes for granted, and places a value on, a world divided into discrete and largely autonomous socio-political units. Without (national) borders, migration isn’t an issue. In the second, while the focus on migrants, and the stigmatisation they often face, is a worthy objective, it often neglects the experiences of those within the host society, in many cases dismissing them as xenophobes or racists. By actively engaging with these people, and trying to understand how they make sense of their own status and place within a rapidly changing world, we can provide a more sophisticated understanding of debates around migration and why it has risen to the topic of political and media agendas in recent years. 

Such an approach draws directly on the work of Ghassan Hage who in his book White Nation​[1]​ makes a number of points that are relevant to this discussion. First, he argues that debates around immigration are primarily about ‘spatial management’, even if they sometimes incorporate racist beliefs. In this way, he shows how the presence and activities of perceived ‘others’ can only be identified and evaluated in relation to a specific territory. This is not to deny the significance of racial categories, or their consequences, rather it demonstrates the importance of boundaries in allowing dominant groups to secure and manage a given (national) space. After all, the claim that there are ‘too many’ of this or that group can only be made in relation to an identifiable and hence bounded territory. For instance, opponents of immigration to Britain do not care about the number of Poles in Poland or Nigerians in Nigeria.  It is the presence of these ‘foreign’ groups within ‘their’ country that is of consequence.

This idea leads on to a second important point, which is the distinction between those who feel entitled to make such judgements as well as the ‘others’ who are subject to this managerial gaze. This is a key insight that points to the hierarchies of belonging that operate within any given nation as well as the particular features (physical traits, forms of knowledge, values and beliefs, competencies and so on) that underpin claims to belong. This might include everything from skin colour and accent to knowledge of particular sports or the ability to prepare (and enjoy) certain foods. Moreover, the consequences of these processes of stratification need to be explored as an expression of power relations at both ends of the spectrum. 

As we have seen much of the academic focus has been on those who occupy marginal positions and the anxiety and uncertainty, not to mention exclusion, they experience as a result. Alternatively, it is those who unquestioningly believe and are treated as if they ‘really’ belong that are able to position themselves as the rightful arbiters and managers of the nation. This not only provides them with an important sense of agency, in an era where growing numbers feel increasingly disenfranchised, but also informs powerful claims to key social, economic and cultural resources. In other words, there is a strong link between belonging and entitlement, so that ‘I belong more than you’ also means ‘I deserve more than you’.

Furthermore, and this is fundamental to my overall argument, this sense of entitlement isn’t only linked to material resources (housing, welfare, jobs) but also less tangible psycho-social benefits, such as the power to make judgements about the behaviour of ‘others’, the right to feel comfortable and secure in a particular place and the ability to be understood, and understand others, in a relatively trouble free manner. These features are much more difficult to define, without descending into slightly obscure academic jargon, but the sociologist Anthony Giddens’ writing around ‘ontological security’​[2]​ offers a useful starting point. 

Ontological security ‘refers to the confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action’. Put simply, it concerns the issue of whether I, as an individual, can rely on things – people, objects, places, meanings – remaining tomorrow, by and large, as they were today and the day before. Using these discussions as a template, I’ve argued that one key source of ontological security for substantial numbers, in places like Britain, is the idea of living in, and belonging to, a nation. Moreover, this sense of security is predicated upon a range of familiar, and largely taken-for-granted, places, institutions, everyday practices and forms of knowledge that make the world seem more meaningful and manageable. From a top-down perspective, think of the ways in which government departments, educational establishments, media organisations, corporate interests and civil society actors (charities, trade unions, churches) all continue to address (and constitute) national audiences by referencing national symbols and assuming particular forms of shared knowledge about who and what matters. Likewise, the centralisation of planning and organisation, within the boundaries of the nation, generates a familiar pattern of regions, locales, institutions and everyday fixtures that underpin relatively stable networks of relationships, objects and places. Temporal regularities, associated with work, worship, media rituals, transport systems, holidays, sports events, major anniversaries and celebrations, are another key element in enabling disparate individuals to manage their daily lives and also connect them to the wider ‘community’. These processes are complemented by the routine activities of countless individuals, who through everyday conversations and interactions reflect the idea that they live in and belong to nations.

To reiterate, then, it is these countless features that enable many people – as isolated and insignificant individuals – to categorise, make sense of and act in what otherwise might be seen as an overwhelming, uncertain and sometimes frightening world. In noting the value of this taken-for-granted national framework in generating a valued sense of self, place and community, we can also begin to explain why (perceived) challenges to it are so passionately debated and, often, resisted. And, indeed, much of the empirical research into the experiences of more dominant groups, whether in Britain or beyond, points to an increasing sense of unease and anxiety concerning their changing face of ‘their’ society and the privileged position they occupy within it. 

Moreover, while this sense of unease is sometimes discussed in terms of jobs and housing, it is more often articulated in relation to perceived threats to everyday activities or symbols.  To take but one example, a report by Lord Ashcroft into the attitudes of UKIP supporters notes that while immigration is their primary concern, they ‘are driven towards UKIP by a deeper unease simply with the way life has changed in modern Britain’. 

‘…. schools, they say, can’t hold nativity plays or harvest festivals any more; you can’t fly a flag of St George any more; you can’t call Christmas Christmas any more; you won’t be promoted in the police force unless you’re from a minority; you can’t wear an England shirt on the bus; you won’t get social housing unless you’re an immigrant; you can’t speak up about these things because you’ll be called a racist; ... All of these examples, real and imagined, were [used] … to make the point that the mainstream political parties are so in thrall to the prevailing culture of political correctness that they have ceased to represent the silent majority’

This report pretty much echoes the academic research around this topic over the past few years​[3]​. In objective terms, one might find these concerns over the right to celebrate Christmas or fly the English flag rather puzzling given there is very little evidence that these activities have ever been proscribed. Yet, tabloid reports and, other forms of apocryphal story-telling, seem to resonate because they chime with wider anxieties concerning the increasing power and agency of ‘other’ people and, in turn, the (perceived) loss of status, privilege and control for those who consider themselves to be at the centre of national life.





For my research, I carried out a series of 20 group interviews with people across England, asking what they liked and disliked about living ‘here’ and how things had changed over the past few years. As for the wider survey data, many people raised the subject of immigration as a concern, to the extent that it was sometimes difficult to get them to talk about anything else. A second common feature of these discussions was the degree to which they emphasised the growing problem of immigrant numbers in the contemporary era. The first example comes from a group of retired, middle-class people in south-west London, the second from an interview with a working-class group, aged 30-40 years, based in Hastings, a seaside town on the south coast of England. 

Derek: They talk about … the …. life in London has been increased, made more attractive by … erm … a mixture of people but I don’t think it necessarily ….





Trevor: I don’t see it. 

Derek: No, I don’t see it. 

Interviewer: Why’s that? 













Jamie: ... so, y’know, it’s, it’s a mixture of things which, y’know, have led from what we were like 50 years ago to, y’know, .. er .. I don’t think people then would have ever realised that it could have changed round so much. 

Greg:  .. I think we are the victims of our own tolerance ...

Carole: I do. 

Greg: .. and, and those attitudes have changed, over this period since the Second World War.

Interviewer: Why do you think that is?





Initially, it’s worth noting that both sets of speakers are placing themselves in the in-group that has the right to make judgements about the presence of ‘others’, through the use of the terms ‘we’ and ‘our’. However, in both cases, agency in given to the outsiders who are first described as a ‘swarm’, something that cannot be quantified or controlled. Subsequently, ‘we’ are defined as the victims of ‘our own tolerance’. While, tolerance usually implies ‘courtesy that a dominant or privileged group has the power to extend to, or, withhold from others’​[4]​, in this instance, it has enabled ‘others’ to change the country so much that people from 50 years ago would no longer recognise it.

It’s also interesting that both groups use the Second World War as a starting point for discussing the profound social changes that Britain has undergone. This period continues to resonate within wider popular discourse as a marker of positive national attributes and also feeds into a broader myth of homogeneity concerning a mythologised past where Britain was unified and thus able to meet the challenge from external threats.  Both extracts point to the idea of acceptable limits and, in doing so attempt to guard against possible counter-accusations of prejudice. In the first exchange, reference is made to the Jews, escaping the Nazi regime, in 1938, while in the second a willingness to ‘assimilate small numbers’ is contrasted with a resistance to outsiders that occurs at a range of levels, including the village, thereby making it seem part of the natural order of things. In these formulations, nations are seen to have a ‘natural territoriality, a protective instinct over their own space …  When outsiders enter this space, there is a threshold of tolerance (a breaking point), after which there is a natural reaction against further incursions’​[5]​. 

A sense of control or agency is at the heart of these debates so that it is not the mere presence of ‘others’ that is problematic but ‘how that otherness is kept in its place, rather than … being entirely excluded’​[6]​. Above all, these types of debates again point to the importance of secure boundaries in trying to identify and then manage ‘otherness’. In other words, ‘too many’ only makes sense in relation to a bounded territory where the presence of ‘outsiders’ can be quantified and evaluated so as to ensure that the nation remains familiar, comfortable and homely for those who belong without question. 

In the final part of this paper, I’d like to switch focus slightly in order to address two further issues. The first links these discussions with the rise of UKIP as their supporters tend to be motivated by anxieties over immigration and, as a result, put forward some of the most exclusionary definitions of national belonging. The second considers how hierarchies of belonging within Britain, and England, may shift over the coming years. Of particular interest, here, will be both the growing tendency of ethic minorities to define themselves (and be recognised) as British in relation to newer migrant groups, including those from Eastern Europe, as well as the possible impact that devolution may have on such claims, notably for non-white groups in England. 

UKIP – ageing, active, angry, anxious 

Started, in 1993, with the aim of withdrawing Britain from the EU after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, UKIP was until relatively recently a largely negligible presence on the UK political scene. Its recent gains, culminating in the party securing coming first in the May 2014 European elections, seem to be a combination of two factors. First, it has managed to harness the growing antipathy towards all mainstream political parties in the UK by portraying itself as anti-establishment. Second, its populist, right-wing agenda that employs both anti-European and anti-immigration rhetoric, alongside some vaguely defined neo-liberal economic policies, has gained increasing traction among particular sections of the population.

As the earlier quote from a report by Lord Ashcroft into the views of UKIP supporter’s demonstrated, the party attracts those who are anxious about wider social and cultural changes that they perceive as a challenge to the nation’s culture and territory. But who are these people? And what might the growth of the party tell us about wider social-cultural cleavages in Britain? 

First and foremost, UKIP supporters are much more likely to be older than the average voter and also attract slightly more men (57%). According to one of the more in-depth studies, by YouGov (​http:​/​​/​yougov.co.uk​/​news​/​2013​/​03​/​05​/​analysis-ukip-voters​/​" \t "_blank​) in February 2013, 71% of UKIP voters are over 50, compared with 46% for the population as a whole. Second, the party’s supporters generally have less formal education and a slightly lower than average income, which means they are more likely to be in lower social groups (C2 and DE), rather than ABC1. This is a really significant finding as it shows that far from only attracting disgruntled, and affluent, Tories, UKIP is increasingly taking voters from Labour and, to a lesser degree, the Liberal Democrats, as well. Indeed, some of the established Labour heartlands in the North of England have seen quite substantial shifts (​http:​/​​/​www.tusc.org.uk​/​16786​/​16-06-2013​/​ukip-challenge-for-labour-and-tusc-in-council-by-elections" \t "_blank​) in the recent local elections. Finally, most of their supporters are white (​http:​/​​/​www.theguardian.com​/​commentisfree​/​2014​/​mar​/​05​/​left-behind-voters-only-ukip-understands​), with the vast majority also coming from England. Here, it’s also worth noting that UKIP supporters (​http:​/​​/​www.ippr.org​/​articles​/​56​/​11020​/​if-our-political-class-continues-to-ignore-the-english-question-ukip-could-prosper" \t "_blank​) express the strongest sense of English identity and the greatest sense of dissatisfaction with the current constitutional system in the UK.

These figures indicate the type of people that support UKIP – older, with less formal education, white and English – and, as we have already seen they are motivated by concerns about the way they think the country has changed for the worse over the last two decades. One might argue, of course, that the idea that older generations lament processes of change, and, the purported decline of social norms and values, is nothing new. However, the fact that these views are now largely informed by concerns around immigration and, in particular, the perceived challenge that an increasingly diverse (younger) population is seen to represent to the established status of the majority, is significant. 





However, when thinking about the future of these debates around migration and belonging, it is important to acknowledge that they cannot only be framed in terms of UKIP and their supporters or, indeed, popular stereotypes of old bigots and young liberals. For while, UKIP have grabbed much of the attention, there is growing evidence that migration is also viewed as a concern by other constituencies within Britain, including ethnic minorities born and brought up in the country. As Eric Kaufmann and Gareth Harris have noted the majority of British Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims also say that they would like to see more immigration controls.  

Therefore, while there is no doubt that hierarchies of belonging in Britain, are still partly predicated on racial differences, the terms of the debate are changing because it can no longer be defined as a simple issue of black and white due to the recent influx of migrants from Eastern Europe. That is, the distinction between non-whites as the interlopers, whites as the hosts is beginning to unravel. Furthermore, attitudes among both ethnic majority and minority Briton’s are also shifting. In the former case, there is a general tend towards greater acceptance of ethnic diversity (​http:​/​​/​www.britishfuture.org​/​articles​/​reports​/​new-report-the-melting-pot-generation​/​​) and a willingness to recognise non-whites as British. In the latter case, there is growing anecdotal evidence (​http:​/​​/​www.theguardian.com​/​commentisfree​/​video​/​2013​/​mar​/​18​/​ukip-immigration-eu-toilets-video​) that second and third generation ethnic minorities are increasingly willing to assert their own sense of belonging, and entitlement, in relation to more recent arrivals. In other words, they increasingly view Britain as ‘their’ country and, as a result, lay claim to the benefits (economic and social) that flow from this. This is borne out by much of the survey evidence which notes that the majority of ethnic minorities are more than willing to identify themselves as British. While this is an interesting development and indicates the extent to which British has become a marker of civic, rather than ethnic, identity, one further issue, which has been somewhat overlooked, should be raised. 

This concerns the impact that any vote for Scottish independence may have on those who live in England. For it is worth noting that in all the discussions of devolution in Scotland, relatively little has been said of the consequences this might have for different groups in England. This is because English remains a far more exclusionary identity category than British and one that is both rejected by ethnic minorities and increasingly embraced by members of the majority as a way of distinguishing themselves (in both senses of the term). In other words, any ‘yes’ vote will have a major impact on how ethnic minorities, who have so long struggled to be recognised as belonging to Britain, both define themselves and are defined by the majority. This is something that few policy makers have been addressing even as the signs of a tentative debate around Englishness has emerged over the last few years. It may yet become another fault line in the ongoing and shifting debates around what it means to belong in Britain, and England, in the contemporary era. 
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